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The Avatars of Virtual Representation
An Assessment of the Burkean Notion’s
Contemporary Relevance 
CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU
There are two significant challenges to current democratic theorizing on political 
representation. One, with a long and illustrious history, concerns the way in which a 
radical contrast between electoral representation and public participation is treated 
by democratic theorists and activists. It is an important and on-going debate, which 
has mobilized both advocates of participatory democracy and neo-Schumpeterian 
theorists1, and the dimensions of this controversy are still considerable2. Whether 
asserting3 or rejecting4 the existence of such a conflict between representation and 
participation, theorists draw on a large body of political scholarship. A second, 
equally important, challenge concerns the way in which we can understand 
representation ”beyond the ballot”. This time, the contrast is not between the distinct 
virtues or vices of representation vs. direct citizen participation, but rather between 
considering representation itself as exclusively centered on electoral processes – 
and, even more narrowly, on the ”dyadic” relationship between voters and their 
particular representative – and accepting the theoretical and practical possibility 
of representation independent of, or separated from such electoral contexts. This 
article explores the way in which research on the later direction has been articulated 
recently, and how it might enrich our understanding of political representation. By 
pondering about the specific conditions in which such ”virtual representation” can be 
meaningful this research suggests a number of considerations to guide our analysis 
and understanding of these theoretical developments.
Some of the recent literature5 on political representation seems thus to have taken 
up Edmund Burke’s challenge of conceiving of representation well beyond a purely 
electoral context. This article examines the analytical, normative and institutional 
1 Nadia URBINATI, Mark E WARREN, ”The Concept of Representation in Contemporary 
Democratic Theory”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 11, no. 1, 2008, pp. 387-412.
2 Frank FISCHER, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment, Duke University Press, 2000; 
IDEM, Democracy and Expertise, Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK), 2009.
3 Benjamin R. BARBER, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, 1st ed., 
University of California Press, 2004.
4 Nadia URBINATI, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, University of 
Chicago Press, 2008; David PLOTKE, ”Representation is Democracy”, Constellations, vol. 4, 
no. 1, 1997, pp. 19-34.
 5 Jane MANSBRIDGE, ”Rethinking Representation”, American Political Science Review, 
vol. 97, no. 4, 2003, pp. 515-528; Melissa S. WILLIAMS, ”Burkean ’Descriptions’ and Political 
Representation: A Reappraisal”, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science 
politique, vol. 29, no. 1, 1996, pp. 23-45; Heinz EULAU et al., ”The Role of the Representative: 
Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke”, The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 53, no. 3, 1959, pp. 742-756.
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dimensions of such ”non-elective representative claims”1, as they are articulated (albeit 
under different designations) by authors such as Michael Saward2, Jane Mansbridge3, 
Andrew Rehfeld4 or in the earlier study of Robert Weissberg5. A first section of this 
paper attempts to identify the way in which Burke himself defined and integrated 
the notion of virtual representation in his important, albeit rather non-systematic 
approach to political representation. Hanna Pitkin’s contemporary scholarship on 
Burke, as well as a number of other recent studies6, have provided a necessary update 
on his political views and his concept of virtual representation. A second section 
reviews a number of contemporary positions that restate and elaborate on Burke’s 
initial formulation, conserving a basic analytical structure of the concept of virtual 
representation (the absence of an electoral connection between the representative 
and the represented), yet staying away, at the same time, from the more substantial 
Burkean notions of fixed, nation-wide objective interests, or of a natural aristocracy. 
In the last section, I suggest that there are two important directions in which research 
on the avatars of virtual representation can meaningfully develop: one, privileging 
the expansion and increased accuracy of existing partisan political representation 
mechanisms and procedures in order to include previously ignored or suppressed 
legitimate individual or group interests (enfranchising identities, preferences); while 
a second direction of modern and contemporary scholarship on virtual representation 
theory aims, on the contrary, to transcend any partisan and particularistic identities 
to be represented, and offers either to reproduce an original unanimity, totality, unity 
of the people, or to foster the general interest and the common good. Both these 
directions can find inspiration in Burke’s plural conception of representation, yet they 
face some of the original difficulties also.
These difficulties stem, in part, from virtual representation’s ambiguous relation 
with electoral representation. Furthermore, such difficulties are raised also by the 
fact that replacing Burke’s original understanding of interests and ”descriptions” in 
a contemporary context is not straightforward. Even in Burke’s account, despite its 
conceptual clarity and thought-provoking style, a significant conundrum is present 
when considering the normative foundations of virtual representation, as well as 
the institutional implications of such a notion. These are the difficulties that are still 
1 Michael SAWARD, ”Authorisation and Authenticity: Representation and the Unelected”, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 1, 2009, pp. 1-22; Jane MANSBRIDGE, ”Rethinking 
Representation”, cit.
2 Michael SAWARD, ”The Representative Claim”, Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 5, 
2006, pp. 297-318; IDEM, ”Authorisation and Authenticity…cit.”.
3 Jane MANSBRIDGE, ”Rethinking Representation”, cit.
4 Andrew REHFELD, The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, 2005; IDEM, ”Representation 
Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation 
and Democracy”, American Political Science Review, vol. 103, no. 2, 2009, pp. 214-230.
5 Robert WEISSBERG, ”Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress”, The American 
Political Science Review, vol. 72, no. 2, 1978, pp. 535-547.
6 Melissa S. WILLIAMS, ”Burkean ’Descriptions’ and Political Representation…cit.”; 
Samuel H. BEER, ”The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical 
Background”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 51, no. 3, 1957, pp. 613-650; James 
CONNIFF, ”Burke, Bristol, and the Concept of Representation”, The Western Political Quarterly, 
vol. 30, no. 3, 1977, pp. 329-341; George J. GRAHAM, ”Edmund Burke’s ’Developmental 
Consensus’”, Midwest Journal of Political Science, vol. 16, no. 1, 1972, pp. 29-45.
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confronted by contemporary accounts of virtual representation, and the purpose of 
this contribution is to outline some of the possible avenues of fruitful research. 
It is customary1 for new articles on political representation to pay tribute to the 
established canon in the field, Hanna Pitkin’s original2 treatment of the notion. That 
work offered two of the most used assumptions of subsequent discussions of the 
concept of representation: first, that the concept does have a single, fixed meaning 
over time and usage: 
”Representation does have an identifiable meaning, applied in different 
but controlled and discoverable ways in different contexts. It is not vague and 
shifting, but a single, highly complex concept that has not changed much in its 
basic meaning since the seventeenth century”3. 
The second assumption shared since Pitkin has been the definition itself of the 
concept: 
”Representation, taken generally, means the making present in some sense of 
something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact”4.
Democratic political representation, according to Pitkin, is built upon either formal 
elements of authorization and accountability (representatives are authorized by the 
represented, and are held responsible to them), or upon more substantive elements 
(who the representative is; what does he do as a representative). Pitkin’s impressive 
work of conceptual clarification and classification of types of representation has 
since determined political scientists to place their own contributions either as an 
elaboration, or as a critique of Pitkin’s typology and methodology, which meant ever-
finer refinements of the analytical and normative tools we use to understand political 
representation. 
The main research question for much of contemporary democratic theory 
of political representation is still that of understanding how and why would 
representatives act in the best interest of the citizens, or at least of a majority of 
citizens. But despite the fact that Pitkin herself allowed for a concept of representation 
that was not tied to electoral contexts, most contemporary studies offer a definition 
of representation that is usually narrowed down to a relation between a voter (or a 
constituency) and a representative. This ”dyadic”5 form of representation provides 
both the analytical and the normative background for the most common critiques of 
how representative democracy functions today6. 
One of the consequences of this focus on the electoral relation between voters 
and representatives, where the crucial aspects pertain to formal authorization and 
1 David JUDGE, Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain, 1st ed., Routledge, London, 
2000.
2 Hanna Fenichel PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, 
1967.
3 Ibidem, p. 8.
4 Ibidem, pp. 8-9.
5 Robert WEISSBERG, ”Collective vs. Dyadic Representation…cit.”. 
6 Adam PRZEWORSKI, Susan Carol STOKES, Bernard MANIN, Democracy, Accountability, 
and Representation, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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accountability, is that many theorists seem to believe that any ”deficit” of representation 
– defined as lack of acting in the best interest of the voters – could be corrected by 
modifying electoral procedures, or expanding our understanding of how electoral 
representation functions. Yet such almost-exclusive focus reveals also the inevitable 
normative and institutional limits of the various forms of ”promissory” representation 
– and thus, the limited relevance of the question of how could citizens actually control 
the keeping of promises by elected officials. These limits of the electoral dimension of 
representation allow then for a larger perspective that can stimulate the exploration 
of the Burkean insight of a ”virtual” dimension of representation.
Burke’s Account of Virtual Representation
There are at least two important ways in which Edmund Burke contributed to 
the reflection on political representation. In the first one, he famously asserted and 
privileged one of the terms of the canonical – yet still highly contested – dichotomy of 
mandate v. trustee representation. His definition of political representation as deliberative 
trusteeship still provokes and stimulates political thought. The second, related 
contribution to this topic is the reflection on the conceptual possibility and political 
limits of virtual representation. The two notions are distinct yet inter-related, with 
many theorists continuing to ponder the aspects of Burkean political representation. 
It is symptomatic for the character of Burke’s political thought that both these 
notions are most boldly articulated in letters, speeches and pamphlets, and not 
necessarily in systematic works or treaties. In the Speech to the Electors of Bristol1, Burke 
offers one of the best formulation of his conception of political representation. He 
first rejects any subjection of his view on his role as a representative to his voters’ 
preferences:
”If Government were a matter of Will upon any side, yours, without 
question, ought to be superior. But Government and Legislation are matters of 
reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and, what sort of reason is that, 
in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men 
deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are 
perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?”2.
The key contrast here is between will and reason. Privileging reason over will 
considerably weakens the electoral connection, a connection which fades even further 
with the real-time redefinition of the constituency: as Hanna Pitkin observes, a Burkean 
member of Parliament represents the nation as a whole, not the members who elected 
him; any narrow concept of representation as authorization and accountability loses 
its substance when confronted with the simultaneous redefinition and reconsideration 
of the constituency. 
This is an important aspect of Burke’s particular understanding of constituencies 
and representation. A certain redefinition of constituency might be involved also 
1 Edmund BURKE et al., The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. III, Party, Parliament, 
and the American Crisis 1774-1780, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 64-70.
2 Ibidem, p. 66.
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in what Jane Mansbridge terms as ”anticipatory representation”, a category in her 
conceptual classification. In contrast with ”promissory representation”, where a voter 
expects his representative to act on the promises made to him at the moment of the 
elections (VT1 Æ RT2) Mansbridge envisages, with anticipatory representation, the 
strategic shift of the representative’s perspective in such a way that after being elected 
at T1 by voter V, the representative immediately starts to act in anticipation of the 
next elections, and of how voters might judge him at that later moment (RT2 Å VT3). In 
this way, the accountability involved in anticipatory representation is not towards the 
voters at T1, but towards those at T2. 
Burke also seems to think here that a representative is simply not accountable to 
the original constituency, but this is not for reasons related to electoral strategy, but 
rather as a matter of principle. 
”You chose a Member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not 
Member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament. If the local Constituent 
should have an Interest, or should form an hasty Opinion, evidently opposite to 
the real good of the rest of the Community, the Member for that place ought to 
be as far, as any other, from any endeavour to give it Effect”1.
In other words, the reconfiguration of constituencies has nothing to do with the 
prospect of increasing the chances of re-election (Burke himself is definitely not re-
elected). The reason is related to Burke’s idea of what exactly these representatives are 
supposed to represent (the ”general Good”), and how are they most likely able to do it: 
in a deliberative setting, as trustees. The formal, electoral, elements of authorization and 
accountability are subordinated to the more substantive dimension of representation.
This supports Pitkin’s suggestion that, for Burke, ”[e]lections are merely a means 
of finding the members of a natural aristocracy, and presumably any other method 
of selection would be as acceptable if it were equally efficient at picking them out”2. 
His redefinition of constituency is not merely territorial/formal, but substantive as 
well. Members of Parliament are supposed to promote the ”general Good”, of ”one 
Nation”, and not particular interests that citizens in their diversity might have, 
however important and legitimate. 
Perhaps the most oft-quoted fragment of Burke’s view on political representation, 
the following text has the definite merit of clarity and of exposing the grounds for a 
more substantive dimension of representation: 
”Parliament is not a Congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile 
interests; which interests each must maintain, as an Agent and Advocate, against 
other Agents and Advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative Assembly of one 
Nation, with one Interest, that of the whole; where, not local Purposes, not local 
Prejudices ought to guide, but the general Good, resulting from the general 
Reason of the whole”3.
The basic features of this first Burkean concept of political representation are, 
then, trusteeship of one nation’s general interest, in a public deliberative and reasoned 
1 Ibidem, p. 67.
2 Hanna Fenichel PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, cit., p. 171.
3 Edmund BURKE et al., The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke…cit., p. 67.
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process. To be a Burkean trustee does not mean merely absence of a mandate, as more 
narrow definitions allow, but to meet important substantive (pursue common good) 
and procedural (reasoned deliberation) requirements that the Member of Parliament 
cannot ignore. 
As we see in the later sections, this first Burkean concept of political representation, 
with its weak and dissolving electoral connection and focus on the idea of ”a 
deliberative Assembly of one Nation, with one Interest, that of the whole”, inspires 
an important direction of the contemporary accounts on virtual representation: 
non-adversarial virtual representation. While Burke himself is not ready to dismiss 
elections altogether, it is clear that in this particular context they are not the core 
of the substantive dimension of representation. If a better method of selecting his 
”natural aristocracy” could be figured out and adopted, we might perhaps disregard 
any dyadic, electoral relationship between the citizens and their representatives. If 
the members of Parliament are supposed to deliberate on the ”general Good” of 
the nation, and not advance the preferences of the constituency that voted them, 
then the electoral significance of political representation seems indeed to be purely 
instrumental. 
But Burke’s irony is that while dismissing the value of the electoral bond when 
addressing his electors, he reconfirms its importance precisely when developing his 
concept of virtual representation. The whole ambiguity and difficulty of any attempt 
to completely detach political representation from any electoral context is thus here 
in plain sight. Burke himself never conceived of virtual representation as entirely 
independent from electoral procedures, even when he described it as superior to 
electoral representation.
The concept of virtual representation is thus discussed by Burke as part of a 
larger reflection on the proper representation of Irish Catholics in the Irish House. 
In ”A letter from the Right Hon. Edmund Burke ... to Sir Hercules Langrishe, on the 
subject of Roman Catholics of Ireland and the propriety of admitting them to the 
elective franchise, consistently with the principles of the constitution as established at 
the revolution”, Burke writes:
”Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests, 
and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of 
any description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though the 
trustees are not actually chosen by them. This is virtual representation. Such a 
representation I think to be, in many cases, even better than the actual. It possesses 
most of its advantages, and is free from many of its inconveniences: it corrects 
the irregularities in the literal representation, when the shifting current of human 
affairs, or the acting of public interests in different ways, carry it obliquely from 
its first line of direction. The people may err in their choice; but common interest 
and common sentiment are rarely mistaken”1.
”Actual” and ”literal” representation, here, means electoral representation. 
According to Burke, being virtually represented might entail, ”in many cases, 
even better” representation than when choosing the trustees oneself in electoral 
competitions. This happens because the choices of voters might be faulty, and this 
1 Edmund BURKE, ”Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe (1792)”, in IDEM, The Works, vol. 4, 
Nimmo, London, 1899, pp. 241-306/p. 293.
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may be due to their incorrect understanding of their interests. To understand the 
logic of Burkean virtual representation, thus, we need to recall the sense in which he 
uses the term ”descriptions”. In short, the political community displays a number 
of fixed, objective interests, which are not individual, but, in a sense, collective. 
These interests are shared by several local communities and many individuals, thus 
making it unnecessary for each such community or citizen to have their own elected 
representatives in Parliament. Since Bristol shares in the same interests with, for 
instance, Birmingham, then the representative from Bristol is equally representing 
Birmingham. 
Virtual representation makes sense, then, when many ”participate in” the 
same ”descriptions”, or objective interests. Such representation is not improper, 
nor incorrect representation. It is has two elements: ”communion of interests and a 
sympathy of feelings and desires” between the representatives and the represented, 
even while a formal act of authorization is missing ”not actually chosen by them”). 
The communion of interests is realized when the trustees act on behalf of a certain 
”description of the people”. What, then, are these interests? They are, according to 
Hanna Pitkin, 
”broad, relatively fixed interests, few in number and clearly defined, of which 
any group or locality has just one. These interests are largely economic, and are 
associated with particular localities whose livelihood they characterize, and 
whose over-all prosperity they involve. He speaks of a mercantile interest, an 
agricultural interest, a professional interest”1.
In Pitkin’s analysis, we are not even to speak of representation of citizens, or 
groups, but of interests. Particular constituencies ”participate in” such interests, in 
such a manner that we should speak of the agricultural interest instead of the interest 
of the farmers.
To understand the historical and political context in which Burke articulates his 
conception of virtual representation of such ”descriptions”, an earlier study on this 
context offers a clear portrayal: 
”The legitimate interests, in this sense ’fixed’ and ’corporate’, were of two 
broad types, local and functional, although normally in representation one type 
easily passed over into the other. There were first the local communities united 
by ancient ties of interest which M.P.’s might and ought to promote in Parliament. 
Then-of greater importance to us-there were the broad social groupings not 
confined to a particular place-the various ’estates’, ’ranks’, ’orders’ and-to use the 
term most commonly employed –’interests’, of which the nation and empire were 
composed. Not individuals but such functional groupings were the basic units of 
representation along with the local communities. Hence, virtual representation 
was possible: the M.P. from Bristol, for example, virtually represented not only 
that city, but also all other places which did not have actual representation in 
Parliament, but which, as out-ports and centers of shipping and commerce, had 
common interests with Bristol”2.
1 Hanna Fenichel PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, cit., p. 174.
2 Samuel H. BEER, ”The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical 
Background”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 51, no. 3, 1957, pp. 617-618.
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The crucial aspect of Burkean concept virtual representation is then that its 
validity and relevance is limited to a number of such broad interests that are shared 
by voters and local communities and which are already in part represented through 
electoral procedures. There are elected trustees, and the argument is simply that they 
could act as trustees of all and any of the constituencies that partake in the interest 
they address. 
Thus the relevance of ”actual” representation reveals itself much greater than 
a surface account of the conceptual possibility of virtual representation seemed to 
entail. Yes, Burke considers indeed that one might be represented by a representative 
with which there is no electoral bond. And such a representative might be a better 
one compared with one’s own elected M.P. Yet the important point is that Burkean 
virtual representation is crucially dependent on electoral mechanisms. First, the 
representatives must have been elected in the first place by other constituencies, there 
are no non-electoral ways to become a representative. Second, virtual representation is 
not a safe, definitive substitute of actual representation: the ”sympathy in feelings and 
desires” between represented and representatives cannot subsist without periodical 
confirmations in actual elections.
”But this sort of virtual representation cannot have a long or sure existence, 
if it has not a substratum in the actual. The member must have some relation to 
the constituent. As things stands, the Catholic, as a Catholic and belonging to a 
description, has no virtual relation to the representative; but the contrary”1.
What Burke has in mind here is that if Catholics never elect their representatives 
in the Parliament, then the ”description” itself is not represented, and as such there 
can be no virtual representation. If only adverse descriptions are represented, then the 
harm done to the Catholics, who participate in one of the legitimate and important 
descriptions, amounts to exclusion from the constitution. 
”They who are excluded from votes (under proper qualifications inherent 
in the constitution that gives them) are excluded, not from the state, but from the 
British constitution. They cannot by any possibility, whilst they hear its praises 
continually rung in their ears, and are present at the declaration which is so 
generally and so bravely made by those who possess the privilege – that the best 
blood in their veins ought to be shed, to preserve their share in it; they cannot, I 
say, think themselves in an happy state, to be utterly excluded from all its direct 
and all its consequential advantages. The popular part of the constitution must 
be to them, by far the most odious part of it. To them it is not an actual, and, if 
possible, still less a virtual representation. It is indeed the direct contrary. It is 
power unlimited, placed in the hands of an adverse description, because it is an 
adverse description”2.
Burke’s contribution to the concept of ”virtual representation” is therefore not 
a wholehearted or confident endorsement of virtual representation – but on the 
contrary, an attempt to identify the rare circumstances in which such representation 
would be possible and why such conditions are usually not met. The larger point that 
1 Edmund BURKE, ”Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe…cit.”, p. 292.
2 Ibidem, p. 288.
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Burke tries to make here is that, since Irish Catholics, or American colonists –and the 
associated important and legitimate interests – are not virtually represented, there is 
a risk of alienation. Moreover, virtual representation itself wanes over time, if it does 
not have ”its substratum” in actual representation. 
The paradox then is that when discussing the role of elected representatives 
Burke defined them as trustees and appeared to play down the relevance of the 
formal electoral bond of authorization and accountability, whereas when conveying 
an important concept of virtual representation, he raised the normative weight of 
elections and their importance for the wider political character of the nation. 
For contemporary political theorists interested in taking up Burke’s notion of 
virtual representation and deploying it in ways which innovate conceptually within 
the present debates on democratic representation, the challenges posed by his original 
formulation are significant. On the one hand, this perplexing relation between virtual 
and electoral representation turns out to be less straightforward than expected; 
moreover, compared to Burke’s time, arguments for virtual representation must 
today meet a much changed normative discourse almost exclusively focused on the 
paramount role of elections for democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, the original 
definition of virtual representation had a meaning as formulated against the historical 
background of the understanding of relevant interests as ”descriptions”. For Burke, 
it was essential that all the important interests be represented in Parliament, virtually 
and literally, for multiple, alternating reasons: proper deliberation in the Parliament 
cannot otherwise take place1; lack of representation might lead to alienation and 
conflict; ensuring economic and commercial efficiency; and, as a matter of justice. 
Could, then, a reformulation of a concept of virtual representation make sense today, 
with Burkean interests absent from political theorizing?
Virtual Representation, Revisited
Contemporary views of virtual representation need, then, to separate the 
conceptual structure of virtual representation from Burke’s notion of interests as 
descriptions – and to provide justifiable criteria for being virtually represented. In 
other words, the task of new accounts of virtual representation is to elaborate the 
normative rationale for representation replacing Burkean ”descriptions”. Which 
interests, identities, preferences, should be virtually represented and on what 
grounds?
The current research on the potential virtues of virtual representation is, in a large 
degree, an extension of the reflection on the limits of electoral representation. Such 
limits are either related to the misrepresentation of important interests, identities, 
stakeholders; or, they highlight the excessive partisan division and the domination 
of factions.
Among the early accounts of a version of ”virtual representation”, Robert 
Weissberg’s 1978 essay on ”Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress”2 
included a very clear formulation, with some empirical support, of the idea that there 
1 Melissa S. WILLIAMS, ”Burkean ’Descriptions’ and Political Representation…cit.”, 
pp. 31-32.
2 Robert WEISSBERG, ”Collective vs. Dyadic Representation…cit.”.
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is much more to political representation than the studies focused on electoral contexts 
and procedures allow. 
”[T]he representation of an opinion (or interest) is theoretically independent 
of an electoral connection between the person with a preference and the person 
doing the representing”1.
While recalling Pitkin’s reconstruction of Burkean virtual representation, 
Weissberg seems to concur with a certain reading of Burke’s account in which virtual 
representation might actually be a better form of representation than electoral-
based representation. The contrast between dyadic representation (the relation 
between a representative and the voter(s) or district that elects him) and collective 
representation (the relation between a representative institution as a whole (e.g., a 
Parliament) and the nation itself) is fundamentally concerned with expanding the 
universe of valid representation, as well as with providing a more accurate reading of 
what representation actually entails. 
Here, these remarks seem to anticipate David Plotke’s important 1997 essay, 
”Representation is Democracy”. What is relevant in that work, for our discussion, 
is a quite basic and clear assertion of the meaning of representation, by way of 
identifying its logical, conceptual opposite. In the context of the ideological warfare 
of the cold war, Plotke’s aim is to salvage the dignity of representative democracy 
against accounts that relegate representation as a corrupt, hollow form of democracy 
compared to an ideal of ”true” democracy, i.e. participative, direct democracy. Hence, 
Plotke’s thesis is that ”the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite 
of representation is exclusion. And the opposite of participation is abstention”2. If the 
opposite of representation is exclusion, than an important part of representation must 
precisely be including interests, preferences, identities, in the overall representative 
mechanisms and institutions. The more inclusive, the more representative is an 
institutional arrangement.
This is the tenure of Weissberg’s argument, also: if we view representation as 
concerning more than just a relation between an individual representative and its 
constituency, we realize that a good deal of representing is done collectively: institutions 
collectively representing a people. In this way we accept that many more preferences 
or interests could be represented than if representation were only dyadic. 
There are, according to Weissberg, two implications of this position: one is that, as 
things stand, each one is likely better represented not by one’s elected representative, 
but by some other member(s) of the legislative assembly, of the constitutional courts, 
etc. This is a strong, recurrent argument made by theorists of virtual representation 
who, with Burke, point to the limits of electoral procedures. In Weissberg’s view, 
moreover, what may count as a failure of representation in one account may be 
considered as contributing to overall representation in the other account: 
”A particular legislator’s misrepresentation of constituency opinion can, 
under certain conditions, increase the overall level of opinion representation”3.
1 Ibidem, p. 536.
2 David PLOTKE, ”Representation is Democracy”, cit., p. 19.
3 Robert WEISSBERG, ”Collective vs. Dyadic Representation…cit.”, p. 536.
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In order to explain how collective representation might be superior to dyadic 
forms of representation, Weissberg assimilates the former (and Burkean virtual 
representation, by extension) with 
”the principle of random sampling: a particular individual in a sample of 1500 
from a universe of 210 million does not personally represent 140 000 people, but 
the sample collectively is a close approximation of the 210 000 000 people”1.
Over time, Weissberg claims, citizens are thus more likely to be adequately 
represented by representatives with whom they have no electoral connection. This is, 
in fact, a stronger view than Burke’s conviction that, if the interests of Birmingham are 
the same with the interests of Bristol, there is no need for (dyadic) representation of 
Birmingham, since they are already represented by the MPs from Bristol. The basic idea is 
the same (that one can be represented without the need of an electoral connection) – yet the 
reasons and the configuration of ”virtual” and ”collective” representation are different. 
Weissberg’s collective representation does not depend on Burkean ”descriptions”, or 
more generally on any particular, contested conception of interests. His claim is rather 
that, depending on the overall institutional structure and configuration, it is more likely 
that one’s interests and opinions are shared by some other member of the representative 
body (or bodies) than by the particular M.P. elected in one’s constituency. 
This is related to the second implication of Weissberg’s concept of collective 
representation: that the ”amount of representation” might depend less on the attempts 
to ensure ever more accurate mechanisms of electoral control (voters controlling their 
elected representatives), but more on the quality of overall institutional arrangements. 
Party discipline, for instance, can be either decried or commended depending on the 
perspective on representation that we adopt: ”purely dyadic representation” is clearly 
hindered by national parties representing national majorities, instead of having 
individual representatives representing particular district majorities. Yet representing 
the plurality and complexity of preferences and interests within a constituency 
cannot be exhausted by a single electoral procedure connecting one representative 
with one voter or a single constituency. The nature and configuration of the system of 
representation is then, indeed, crucial.
A final remark on collective representation: following Burke, after insisting on 
the way in which collective representation is political representation, Weissberg 
does not separate it completely from the electoral form of representation. The fact 
that he identifies a different way of understanding political representation does not 
fundamentally alter the primacy of electoral representation. Collective representation, 
as virtual representation, might be better in some ways than dyadic representation, 
but it remains normatively and institutionally conditioned by electoral representation. 
Collective representation cannot completely replace elections and dyadic relations of 
representation; virtual or collective forms of representation build upon, complement, 
and allow us to reconsider the virtues and limits of electoral representation, but they 
do not amount to a substitute thereof. Values of accountability and control – crucial to 
dyadic representation – are not ”trivial politically”2: they are a necessary and integral 
part of that overall quality of the representative system. 
1 Ibidem, p. 537.
2 Ibidem, p. 545.
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Jane Mansbridge’s concept of surrogate representation is, at its core, identical with 
Burke’s virtual representation and Weissberg’s collective representation: 
”Surrogate representation is representation by a representative with whom 
one has no electoral relationship – that is, a representative in another district”1.
In an article whose theoretical ambition and breadth are comparable with 
Pitkin’s effort at conceptual clarification, Mansbridge distinguishes four main types 
of representation and the actors and procedures associated with them. Promissory 
representation, the most common understanding of political representation, is the 
traditional model which conceives representatives as making promises during electoral 
campaigns; they keep, or fail to keep these promises. Anticipatory representation, 
instead of connecting the initial voter with the representative, denotes the forward-
looking perspective of the elected official whose concern is, rather, to represent 
the voters who may re-elect him. Gyroscopic representation severs the formal 
accountability links between the representative and the voters, on the premise that 
in this setting, the elected officials act not for prudential reasons, but rather for their 
own, strong, public reasons. Thus, voters identify candidates who are independently 
committed and motivated, i.e. they don’t need external incentives to act on their 
convictions. Surrogate representation, finally, is the type of representation that lacks 
the formal electoral authorization link.
The lack of an electoral relationship that characterizes virtual or surrogate 
representation is not, however, synonymous with lack of any connection. There is no 
formal electoral element of the bond, yet a vast array of other means of interaction may 
exist. Between relying on remote, big campaign donors, or on large trade unions, etc. 
– and ”pure”2 surrogate representation (where money plays no role), the actors have a 
significant set of opportunities for mobilization and mutual influence: petitions, door-
to-door campaigning, and so on. 
Mansbridge connects her concept of surrogate representation with the legitimacy 
concerns of electoral systems – and more specifically, with the potential of representing 
the minorities in any district. Aside from pure proportional representation, the best 
chance of such minorities to be represented is in surrogate representation, and hence 
the conditions and circumstances in which such representation can acquire a more 
substantive meaning are particularly significant for political science scholarship. 
For Mansbridge, some of the answers to Burke’s original challenges may be 
found in the renewed interest in deliberative democracy: if virtual representation 
addresses the insufficient representation of minority interests, we need viable criteria 
for ascertaining which such minority interests should be virtually represented. 
”A deliberation among all potentially affected participants, marked by a 
minimal intrusion of power and by better rather than worse arguments, should 
ideally decide which interests most conflict and which perspectives are most 
crucial.”3
1 Jane MANSBRIDGE, ”Rethinking Representation”, cit., p. 522.
2 Ibidem, p. 523.
3 Ibidem, p. 524, ftn. 22.
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The perspective here is clearly one in which the normative rationale of virtual 
representation is one that aims to adequately (i.e., proportionally) represent all relevant 
interests. Deliberation helps in mobilizing such relevant interests and making them 
visible:
”The normative question for surrogate representation is […] whether, in the 
aggregate, each conflicting interest has proportional adversary representation in 
a legislative body […] and each important perspective has adequate deliberative 
representation. Such a normative analysis must involve a contest regarding what 
interests most conflict (and therefore most deserve proportional representation) 
in aggregation and what perspectives count as important in deliberation”1.
In an earlier work, Mansbridge discusses the long tradition of ”anti-adversary” 
conceptions of political representation2. While adversary models of representation 
entail electoral competitions, rival interests and majority rule, the reaction to such 
models, ever since Rousseau, has invoked the possibility of – and need for – political 
friendship, common interests and unitary goals3. With its republican roots, this 
important current in the history of political thought influences recent considerations 
of virtual representation too: in contrast with an ”adversary democracy” perspective, 
where the normative question is indeed that of proportional representation of 
competing interests (”[w]hen interests differ, the underlying principles of adversary 
democracy require that the interests of the citizens be represented in proportion to 
their number”4), a ”unitary democracy” assumes that citizens have a common interest, 
and non-adversarial representation encourages ”consensual decision-making” and 
common deliberation5. Such a view must strike a familiar note to readers accustomed 
with Burke’s conception of deliberative trusteeship. 
Wither Virtual Representation?
There are, then, two directions in which further research on virtual representation 
could develop, and they both have a certain origin in the political thought of Edmund 
Burke. One is concerned with representing neglected stakeholders. The identities, 
preferences, interests of various minorities that are not adequately represented in 
current voting procedures in liberal democracies (either for structural reasons6: 
women, indigenous populations, ethnic or religious minorities; or, because of the 
mere constitution of majorities), are to be represented on such an account of virtual 
political representation. We could identify this direction as an attempt to compensate 
for the limits of majoritarian, adversarial democratic arrangements. The second 
direction is not concerned with particular interests, identities or preferences that 
might have been excluded for historical or routine reasons, but on the contrary, 
with overcoming partisan divisions altogether and representing a totality, a general 
1 Ibidem, p. 524.
2 Jane MANSBRIDGE, Beyond Adversary Democracy, University of Chicago Press, 1983.
3 Ibidem, p. 18.
4 Ibidem, p. 118.
5 Ibidem, p. 3.
6 Seyla BENHABIB, Democracy and Difference, Princeton University Press, 1996.
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will, a general interest, common good, etc. The main thrust of this direction is hence 
not identifying previously unrepresented individual or group-based interests and 
challenging dominant electoral procedures for failing to adequately represent them, 
but rather transcending any particularisms and divisions of political communities 
and representing them as wholes. The normative rationales of both these approaches 
are thus historically and conceptually distinct.
The institutions of virtual representation that correspond to these two major 
directions of research could not be more distinct, either. The first type of institutions 
are mainly concerned with re-creating a certain proportional (albeit non-electoral) 
representation of such excluded minorities. Various councils and procedural provi-
sions for including such minority interests within the decision-making process, elec-
toral reforms, and  affirmative action-policies are all specifically set to compensate 
for the multiple majoritarian trends in political life. The second kind of institutions 
pursue non-partisan, general interest goals and are as old as the first bureaucratic 
apparatuses of modern states, or as new as the recently established independent 
regulatory authorities. 
In the various accounts that take for granted a radical distinction between political 
representation and citizen participation, electoral representation is considered by 
definition exclusionary, while participation is inclusive. Yet not all possible reforms 
are limited to participatory or electoral reforms. Theorists of virtual representation can 
here go beyond the common accounts of the inherent limits of electoral representation 
or the impracticalities of participation, and to envisage a wide variety of institutional 
designs that address the claims for virtual representation made by, or on behalf of, the 
electorally misrepresented. 
We can identify this emphasis on virtual representation of neglected interests 
in various guises – and this article cannot attempt an exhaustive categorization 
of institutions and policies that are relevant for this effort. The main challenge of 
this approach has always been that of isolating the relevant excluded interests, 
conceptualizing criteria for identifying legitimate interests. Such legitimate interests 
have been – for different reasons, in different accounts – inadequately represented by the 
default electoral institutions and procedures. The reasons for such misrepresentation 
are either procedural (majority rule per se), contingent, or structural, historical, etc. Such 
interests might be completely neglected electorally (the interests of foreign workers) or 
partially neglected (women have the right to vote, but parties fails to nominate female 
candidates). This ambiguity plays on the idea that simply having the right to vote does 
not automatically entail being adequately represented. One can, after all, participate in 
every ballot, yet have her interests utterly and constantly ignored. 
Repairing such misrepresentation entails either reforming the existing electoral 
mechanisms, or setting up other institutions that work in such a way to compensate 
for the absence of electoral representation by way of virtual representation. In the 
first case, virtual representation can be conceived within the logic of parliamentary 
representation. The absence of an electoral connection between the represented 
and the representative does not presuppose, as we have seen above, the absence of 
any electoral bond. Virtual representation may mean simply, having one’s interests 
adequately represented by the representatives elected by others. This is, in fact, closer 
to the original understanding of virtual representation in Burke’s work, as well as of 
Weissberg’s concept of collective representation. 
In the second case, various councils or ”diversity” bodies are deliberately set 
up outside elective institutions in order to ensure that interests and perspectives of 
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minorities are suitably taken into consideration in policy-making. Such watchdogs 
are meant to virtually represent these excluded identities by, for instance, correcting 
the way in which public media reflects them, or the degree in which public education 
includes and promotes alternative perspectives on history and minority culture. 
These bodies are not electorally accountable to the interests and identities they 
represent. They are established on the premise that specific, legitimate interests are 
not (or insufficiently) represented in parliamentary and other electoral settings. The 
thrust of Burke’s analysis of virtual representation is, precisely, that the risk is that 
of being represented by the adverse parties. And this is worse than simply not being 
represented. Especially within an adversary conception of democracy, the harm of not 
being represented is seen as the probability of being ruled by those who represent the 
rival or enemy interests. 
This is the reason for which virtual representation of excluded interests is not 
exhausted in Parliaments, and various extra-parliamentary institutions are needed. 
Yet the original difficulty of selecting whose particular, competing interests should 
be virtually represented by such bodies is still intact, and the object of legitimate 
normative controversies.
The second main direction of research, on the normative and institutional 
dimensions of non-adversary virtual representation, is equally important, since it 
follows a logic that is completely at odds with the former category of re-presenting 
neglected particular interests. Here, the stake is to identify the common good, the 
general interest of a political community, and then to set up institutions that represent 
– virtually – that overall interest.
Sometimes, the same interests that we might have identified in the previous 
category – say, the interests of the future generation for a clean environment, as distinct 
from (and even opposed to) ours for more material welfare – might be rephrased as 
belonging to this second category: after all, we all may be said to have a common 
interest in preserving the Earth for ourselves and for the future generations. It’s not 
necessarily ”their” interest against ”ours”, but a shared, general one1.
And again, such virtual representation might be perceived in both parliamentary 
and non-elective settings. For instance, reforms of the procedures and functioning of 
Parliaments may lead to what Weissberg understood as collective representation as 
a form of virtual representation: the Parliament, as a whole, represents the interest of 
the nation, beyond the specific electoral connections between particular constituencies 
and individual representatives. 
How could we identify such shared, common interest? Perhaps an important 
body of theoretical work that contributed to this issue is the literature on deliberative 
democracy. The presupposition of a possible consensus, as well as the presupposition 
of a common good are elements in this direction. The question of virtual representation 
revolves, then, around the normative potential of public deliberation to ground a robust 
enough form of representation. Accepting Burke’s injunction that ”Parliament is not 
a Congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile interests”, but ”a deliberative 
Assembly of one Nation, with one interest” is a prerequisite step in this direction.
Yet the most fruitful avenue for contemporary research on virtual representation 
is perhaps not the suggestion that Parliaments themselves might become vectors of 
non-adversarial virtual representation, but rather the exploration of the ways in which 
1 Andrew DOBSON, Green Political Thought, 4th ed., Routledge, London, 2007.
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bureaucracies and independent regulatory agencies represent the general interest 
precisely because they are not manned by elected officials. The examination of the 
representative function of bureaucracies has mobilized important traditions of political 
science and sociological scholarship, with the aim of identifying the procedural and 
structural resorts of such representativeness. Theories of representative bureaucracy1 
have had to address the classical criticism that bureaucracy limits democracy. That 
argument claims that, since the bureaucracies and independent regulatory agencies 
are 1) operating on the basis of specialized knowledge (hence, epistemic insulation 
from elected officials) and 2) inevitably exercising considerable discretionary 
authority (institutional insulation), they pose a serious challenge to the capacity of 
elected officials to effect policy and be accountable to their constituencies. By altering 
the electoral mechanisms of representation, bureaucracies represent therefore a threat 
to democratic representation itself2.
The answer to this criticism is that both expertise and discretion serve the general 
interest, and that such institutions enforce impartial procedural standards, non-
arbitrary processes, and that electoral accountability was itself already problematic 
and difficult to measure. The contrast with the legitimacy and representativeness 
of elected officials is real, yet these institutions have a legitimacy of their own3, and 
hence a normative basis for representativeness – virtual representation. 
Contemporary independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), both in the US and the 
EU, while distinct from the classical idea of bureaucracy, share some of the most 
relevant conundrums of democratic legitimacy and offer at the same time important 
perspectives on the possibilities and promises of virtual representation. An increasing 
body of important works4 attempt to clarify the way in which the regulatory purposes 
of these institutions5 may be considered as becoming part of a full-blown theory of 
political representation – in its virtual guise.
1 William NISKANEN Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government, 1st ed., Aldine 
Transaction, 2007; Julie A. DOLAN, David H ROSENBLOOM, Representative Bureaucracy: Classic 
Readings and Continuing Controversies, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk (NY), 2003.
2 Eva ETZIONI-HALEVY, Bureaucracy & Democracy: A Political Dilemma, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Books Ltd, London, 1985.
3 Pierre ROSANVALLON, La légitimité démocratique: Impartialité, reflexivité, proximité, Seuil, 
Paris, 2008.
4 Christian JOERGES, Ellen VOS, EU Committees, Social Regulation, Law and Politics: Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999; Casimo MONDA, Adriaan SCHOUT, 
Ellen VOS, EU Agencies in and the External Relations of the EU, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague/London, 2009; Fabrizio GILARDI, Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent 
Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, Edward Elgar Publishing, Camberley (UK)/Northampton 
(USA), 2009.
5 Giandomenico MAJONE, Regulating Europe, 1st ed., Routledge, London, 1996; IDEM, 
Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2009.
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Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper is that the coherence of any account of virtual 
representation cannot be limited to its conceptual analysis. The particular approach 
to understanding the concept of political representation that Pitkin inaugurated is 
only partially pertinent for a more substantial effort to assess the relevance of virtual 
representation for current research in democratic theory. We have seen above that 
already in Burke’s writing on virtual representation, the role of formal electoral aspects 
of representation varied from rather instrumental to essential. That means that simply 
defining it as ”representation by a representative with whom one has no electoral 
relationship” (Mansbridge) does not reveal much of its complexity and potential.
What such accounts of virtual representation need in order to be relevant for 
contemporary debates, aside from a definition that has not significantly changed since 
Burke, are, on the one hand, a serious consideration of its normative rationale, and on 
the other hand, an examination of the various institutions that could embody it. This 
paper has only sketched a number of elements for such research, and suggested that 
both the normative arguments and the institutional developments surrounding the 
problematic of virtual representation are best understood if we separate two broad 
visions on the nature of interests, political communities, and democracy: whereas 
within the first account, virtual representation might serve to discover and protect 
interests, identities that are excluded by the default forms of electoral representation, 
the second account envisions the virtual representation of general interests, 
transcending partisan divisions and adversary models of political representation.
When might virtual representation be ”valid” representation, and when 
imposture? What are, in other words, the appropriate criteria for identifying and 
justifying virtual representation? And how are various institutions supposed to 
advance this purpose? Burke’s merit is to have clearly articulated the importance 
of virtual representation, but also the complexity of building a serious and coherent 
account thereof. Such an account needs to engage in the normative exercise of 
defining the interests or identities to be represented, specifying in which sense these 
are not suitably represented within electoral representative arrangements, what kind 
of alternative institutions could best compensate such limits and precisely how are 
these exemplifications of virtual representation.
The possibilities that this renewed interest in the problematic of virtual 
representation opens should not, nevertheless, hinder the fact that there are distinct 
values that we associate with democratic electoral representation and which are 
not embodies in virtual representation, and that relying on the latter might actually 
aggravate some of the classical problems. There are important ways in which political 
agency and authenticity depend on, and are fostered more by electoral processes 
than by substitute mechanisms of virtual representation. Furthermore, virtual 
representation can only incompletely address the increasingly relevant problem of 
the missing overlap between the stakeholders and shareholders of contemporary 
democratic decision-making1. 
1 David HELD et al, Democracy and the Global Order, Polity Press, 1995.
